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Flexing Judicial Muscles: Did the Ninth Circuit Abandon
Judicial Restraint in United States v. Comprehensive
Drug Testing, Inc.?
“Caution is the eldest child of wisdom.”
Victor Hugo 1
I. INTRODUCTION
As we march into the information age, some scholars fear that Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has lagged behind. 2 This fear is particularly
prevalent in the realm of computer searches and seizures. Computers,
some argue, are different from desks, closets, and other containers
because their storage capacity is virtually unlimited. 3 Moreover, modern
computers perform a variety of functions, including “postal services,
playgrounds, jukeboxes, dating services, movie theaters, daily planners,
shopping malls, personal secretaries, virtual diaries, and more.” 4 Due to
a computer’s unique capacity and its many functions, civil libertarians
argue that such electronic devices deserve special Fourth Amendment
protections. While these arguments are common in academic circles, 5
they rarely find their way into actual court decisions. 6 The notable
exception is the Ninth Circuit’s recent en banc decision in United States
v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. 7
In Comprehensive Drug Testing, the Ninth Circuit engaged in
judicial trailblazing by promulgating a set of five “guidelines” that
1. Victor
Hugo,
Famous
Quotes
&
Authors,
http://www.famousquotesandauthors.com/topics/caution_quotes.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
This maxim captures the spirit of the common law tradition that legal rules should evolve slowly
over time. As this case note will demonstrate, the Ninth Circuit abandoned caution in favor of brash
judicial action in Comprehensive Drug Testing.
2. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the
Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1363 (2004);
Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Technology and the
Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L. J. 5, 49 (2002).
3. Posting of Computer Searches and Plain View to UNC School of Government Blog,
http://sogweb.sog.unc.edu/blogs/ncclaw/?p=715 (last visited Nov. 14, 2009) (“At approximately
30,000 pages per gigabyte, a low-end laptop computer with a 250 gigabyte hard drive can store the
equivalent of more than 7 million pages of paper.”).
4. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 569
(2005).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999).
7. 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
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govern the issuing of search warrants and subpoenas for electronically
stored information. These guidelines, which amount to bright-line rules,
are overly broad and reach far beyond the confines of any case or
controversy. 8 While the court’s desire to provide magistrates with clear
guidance is laudable, it is ultimately misguided. The rules established by
the court place too heavy a burden on investigating agencies and
overlook past precedent. Moreover, assuming that the rules are workable,
the computer forensics field is rapidly changing, and, as a result, the
court’s decision will quickly become outdated. 9
This Note begins by providing background information on how
courts have applied the Fourth Amendment to electronic searches. Part
III provides a summary of the facts and reasoning in Comprehensive
Drug Testing. Part IV contains an analysis of the plain view doctrine and
highlights some of the problems with the court’s decision. This section is
subdivided into four subsections. Subsection A argues that the plain view
doctrine should not be abandoned in electronic searches. Subsection B
demonstrates how the court’s decision is burdensome, premature, and
overly broad. Subsection C addresses how the court could have reached
the same result without promulgating the guidelines. Subsection D
outlines my predictions for the future implications of Comprehensive
Drug Testing. Finally, Part V provides a brief summary of the analysis
contained in part IV.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Searching Among Intermingled Documents
Courts have struggled to limit computer searches in ways that
effectively balance privacy and law enforcement interests. This is
because computers often contain information that has nothing to do with
a particular investigation. Consequently, courts must find ways to
“separate the wheat from the chaff” 10 without violating the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on general searches. 11 For electronic devices,
8. Id. at 1012 (Callahan, J., concurring).
9. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004) (“When technology is in flux, Fourth
Amendment protections should remain relatively modest until the technology stabilizes.”).
10. Derek Regensburger, Bytes, Balco, and Barry Bonds: An Exploration of the Law
Concerning the Search and Seizure of Computer Files and an Analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s
Decision in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1151, 1204 (2007).
11. The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance
of any warrant except one ‘particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.’ The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement
was to prevent general searches. By limiting the authorization to search to the specific
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this sifting process is difficult because information on computers can
easily be concealed or mislabeled with incorrect file names or
extensions. 12 For example, an individual wishing to conceal a file might
label it “pesto.recipe in lieu of blackmail.photos.” 13 Thus, ex ante
restrictions that limit computer searches to certain keywords or file types
may cripple an investigator’s ability to uncover evidence that is within
the scope of an investigation. 14 To address problems of intermingled
electronic records, courts have analogized to cases involving nonelectronic records.
For instance, in United States v. Beusch, the defendants in a bank
fraud case objected to the government’s seizure of two ledgers and a
file. 15 Defendants argued that the relevant portions of the documents
were easily identifiable and separable, and that the government’s seizure
was impermissible because it swept up information outside the warrant. 16
Rejecting this argument, the court concluded that “[t]he fact that an item
seized happens to contain other incriminating information not covered by
the terms of the warrant does not compel its suppression, either in whole
or in part.” 17 The court reasoned that although individual files and
ledgers are “theoretically separable, [they] in fact constitute one volume
or file folder.” 18 However, the court provided a caveat, noting that the
seizures of sets of ledgers or files may not be permissible. 19
The distinction between a single ledger and a set of ledgers became
important in United States v. Tamura. 20 In Tamura, government agents
investigating a kickback scheme secured a warrant to search and seize
specific records from a company’s accounting department. 21 In the
course of the search, the agents realized that finding the appropriate
documents would be time-consuming. 22 As a result, the agents decided to
areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that
the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character
of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S 79, 84 (1987).
12. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 995 (noting that in addition to containing
mislabeled files, a computer might have “booby traps that ‘destroy or alter data if certain procedures
are not scrupulously followed’ . . . or data might be encrypted or compressed, requiring passwords,
keycards or other external devices to retrieve.”) (citing Warrant Affidavit at 3).
13. Id. at 995.
14. Kerr, supra note 4, at 571–72; see also United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081,
1090–91 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
15. United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 1979).
16. Id. at 877.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).
21. Id. at 594.
22. Id. at 595.
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seize numerous cardboard boxes and file drawers full of information so
that they could conduct the search in another location. 23 The court held
that this seizure was unacceptable. 24 In dicta, the court suggested two
ways that the government could avoid violating the Fourth Amendment
when documents are too intermingled to separate on site: (1) the
government can seal and hold the documents until the issuing magistrate
provides further authorization, or (2) if law enforcement officials know
that the documents will be intermingled, they can apply for special
authorization to remove the files before executing the search. 25
In subsequent cases, both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have made it
clear that warrants containing prior approval for off-site review of
intermingled documents satisfy the Fourth Amendment. In United States
v. Hay, 26 the Ninth Circuit found that the search and seizure affidavit had
sufficiently established the need to remove the defendant’s entire
computer system. 27 Specifically, the affidavit “justified taking the entire
system off site because of the time, expertise, and controlled
environment required for a proper analysis. This, together with the
magistrate judge’s authorization to do so, [made] inapposite United
States v. Tamura.” 28 Similarly, in United States v. Brooks, 29 the court
upheld a warrant authorizing the off-site search of computer
equipment. 30
In addition to granting prior approval for off-site review, magistrates
guide the discovery of newly uncovered evidence. In United States v.
Carey, 31 officers seized a computer they suspected contained evidence of
drug transactions. 32 The warrant permitted the officers to search for
“names, telephone numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other
23. Id.
24. Id. at 597.
25. Id. at 595–96. Not all courts have applied Tamura’s approach to the electronic records
context. See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d 1085, 1107 (9th Cir.
2005). (“One district court in Michigan explained: ‘The Court declines to follow Tamura, at least in
this case, because Tamura did not involve computer files and therefore did not consider the specific
problems associated with conducting a search for computerized records.’ United States v. ScottEmuakpor, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 31118, 2000 WL 288443, at *8 (W.D. Mich). Although declining
to apply Tamura’s pragmatic approach to computer searches, Judge Quist stated: ‘This is not to
suggest that seizure of all computer disks is permissible whenever the warrant authorizes the seizure
of computer records.’ Id. Another court, also referencing Tamura, noted that in the modern computer
context a ‘suggestion by a panel of the Ninth Circuit in a 20-plus year old case is not persuasive.’
United States v. Kaufman, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21006, at *12, 2005 WL 2304345, at *4 n.3 (D.
Kan).”).
26. 231 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2000).
27. Id. at 637.
28. Id.
29. 427 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2005).
30. Id. at 1251.
31. 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
32. Id. at 1270.
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documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of
controlled substances.” 33 As a technician was searching the computer, he
opened a “JPG” 34 file containing child pornography. 35 The technician
testified that he opened the image file because he believed it might
contain photographs related to drug activity. 36 After opening the image,
the technician downloaded over 244 image files, which he believed
contained pornographic material. 37 The court concluded that the
technician’s search of all but the first image exceeded the scope of the
warrant. 38 Upon discovering the first image, he should have gone to a
magistrate to obtain a new warrant allowing him to search for child
pornography. 39 Like in Tamura, the court in Carey noted that “officers
may seal or hold the documents pending approval by a magistrate of the
conditions and limitations on a further search through the documents.” 40
Thus, a general understanding of the law as illustrated above is that
in order to perform an off-site search of intermingled documents, the
warrant must grant permission for such an off-site search; furthermore, if
a search of electronic documents uncovers criminal activity outside the
scope of the warrant, the search must be stopped until an additional
warrant is obtained. This consensus conforms with United States
Supreme Court precedent. In Andresen v. Maryland, 41 the defendant
unsuccessfully challenged the seizure of business records. 42 Giving
deference to magistrate judges, the Court noted that “responsible
officials, including judicial officials, must take care to assure that
[searches of intermingled documents] are conducted in a manner that
minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.” 43 Moreover, the Court
found that when searching intermingled documents, “it is certain that
some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order
to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to
be seized.” 44 If a cursory examination reveals criminal activity outside

33. Id.
34. A “JPG” file extension is attached to files containing photographs and other images.
However, it is possible to hide text within “JPG” files. The technician conducting the search testified
that he had never “experienced an occasion in which the label ‘JPG’ was used by drug dealers to
disguise text files.” Id. at 1270 n.2.
35. Id. at 1271.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1273.
39. Id. at 1275–76.
40. Id. at 1275.
41. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 482.
44. Id.
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the scope of the warrant, the question then becomes whether the plain
view doctrine, an exception to the warrant requirement, applies.
B. The Plain View Doctrine
Contrary to the court’s decision in Comprehensive Drug Testing,
cases in both the Ninth and Tenth circuits have extended the plain view
doctrine to electronic searches. The plain view doctrine allows officers to
seize incriminating evidence found during an otherwise lawful search.
Under the doctrine, an officer may seize incriminating evidence without
a warrant if three conditions are met: “(1) the officer was lawfully in a
position from which to view the object seized in plain view; (2) the
object’s incriminating character was immediately apparent . . . and (3)
the officer had a lawful right to access the object itself.” 45
In most circuits, the contours of the plain view doctrine as it applies
to electronic searches are unclear. For example, in Carey, the Tenth
Circuit pointed out that “the question of what constitutes ‘plain view’ in
the context of computer files is intriguing and appears to be an issue of
first impression for this court, and many others.” 46 Although the Carey
court claimed to avoid the plain view question, 47 its holding seems to
suggest a return to the inadvertence requirement abandoned in Horton. 48
As discussed above, in Carey, the court found that a computer technician
violated the Fourth Amendment when he abandoned his drug-trafficking
search upon discovering evidence of child pornography. The court,
however, indicated that since the first pornographic image was
inadvertently discovered, its seizure may have been permissible. 49 Later
Tenth Circuit decisions have narrowly interpreted Carey. For example, in
United States v. Grimmett, 50 the court noted that Carey “simply stands
for the proposition that law enforcement may not expand the scope of a
search beyond its original justification.” 51 The Ninth Circuit has taken a
similar approach.

45. United States v. Soussi, 29 F.3d 565, 570 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 136–37 (1990)). Before Horton v. California, a fourth condition focused on the officer’s
subjective intent by requiring that discovery of the evidence be inadvertent. However, in Horton, the
Court abandoned this requirement. See Kerr, supra note 4, at 577–78 (suggesting that bringing back
the inadvertence requirement in the electronic context may provide an effective means of limiting
computer searches).
46. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999).
47. Id.
48. David J. S. Ziff, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Execution of Computer Searches
Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 841, 865–66 (2005).
49. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273.
50. 439 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2006).
51. Id. at 1268.
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In United States v. Wong, 52 police obtained a warrant to search a
defendant’s computer for evidence relating to a murder. 53 The warrant
authorized officers to search computer files containing maps of where the
victim’s body was found, information relating to nine-millimeter
firearms, and images of items found near the body. 54 A forensic expert
determined that the information in the warrant could be stored in plain
text, special text, or graphics files. 55 While searching through graphic
files, the technician discovered child pornography. 56 After noting the
location of the files, he continued to search for evidence related to the
murder. 57 Investigators later used the technician’s discovery to obtain
another warrant to search the defendant’s business computer for evidence
of child pornography. 58
Applying the plain view doctrine, the court found that the child
pornography files were properly admitted. 59 First, the technician was
lawfully searching the computer when he found the incriminating
images. 60 Second, the incriminating nature of the files was immediately
apparent. 61 Third, the officer had a right to open graphic files pursuant to
a valid search warrant. 62 Moreover, the technician complied with the
Carey inadvertence requirement because he did not abandon his original
search after discovering the illegal images. 63
In addition to the reasoning in Wong, the court’s analysis in United
States v. Adjani 64 supports the applicability of the plain view doctrine to
electronic searches. In Adjani, investigators were looking for evidence of
extortion on a co-defendant’s computer. 65 At the time of the search, the
co-defendant was not a suspect; however, this changed after investigators
discovered emails implicating her in the extortion conspiracy. 66 Over the
protests of the co-defendant, the court admitted the emails, concluding
that “[t]here is no rule . . . that evidence turned up while officers are
rightfully searching a location under a properly issued warrant must be
52. 334 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2003).
53. Id. at 833
54. Id. at 834. The search warrant included images of monopoly money and references to
“NWO” or “ZOG” because investigators found these items near the victim’s body. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 835.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 838.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.; United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999).
64. 452 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2006).
65. Id. at 1142.
66. Id.
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excluded simply because the evidence found may support charges for a
related crime (or against a suspect) not expressly contemplated in the
warrant.” 67
While several cases have applied the plain view doctrine to
computers, some legal scholars have argued that the doctrine should not
apply, or should at least be limited, in the computer context. 68 These
arguments are based on the notion that computers are unique and deserve
special Fourth Amendment protections. The idea that computers are
somehow different than other seizeable property was criticized by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Giberson. 69
In Giberson, officers executing a search warrant secured a computer
that was surrounded by suspicious printouts relating to the production of
fake IDs. 70 After securing a second warrant authorizing the search of the
computer, a technician discovered images of child pornography. 71 This
discovery did not alter the technician’s search pattern: he continued to
search for images related to the production of fake IDs, and at no time
did he specifically search for child pornography. 72 The defendant argued
that electronic devices are entitled to enhanced protection and that “the
analogy between a computer and other ‘containers’ is not appropriate.” 73
The court rejected the defendant’s special-protections argument,
finding that neither record format nor storage capacity is relevant in the
Fourth Amendment context. 74 According to the court, distinctions based

67. Id. at 1151.
68. Kerr, supra note 4, at 582–84.
69. 527 F.3d 882, 888–89 (9th Cir. 2008). Giberson is an important case because it was
recently decided and is cited in Comprehensive Drug Testing four separate times. See
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006, 1010–11, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
70. Giberson, 527 F.3d at 885. Officers found social security cards and birth certificates next
to the computer. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 887.
74. Id. at 888. Scholar Thomas K. Clancy also rejected “the notion that there should be
special rules for electronic evidence containers. Otherwise, in his 193, 211 (2005)).
74. Giberson, 527 F.3d at 888.
74. United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 652, 654–55 (9th Cir. 1984).
74. Giberson, 527 F.3d at 888.
74. Id.
74. Id.
74. Id.
74. Id.
74. Regensburger, supra note 10, at 1166.
74. Id.
74. Id.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2009).
74. 28 C.F.R. § 59.4 (2009).
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on record format are arbitrary and run contrary to prior precedent. 75
Previously, the Ninth Circuit had held that while microcassettes may
store information differently than traditional paper, they still constitute
seizable “records.” 76 Similarly, the court concluded that distinctions
based on storage capacity are arbitrary and raise more questions than
they answer. 77 For example, why should officers “be permitted to search
a room full of filing cabinets” but not a computer? 78 Would a special
protections scheme reach external devices like flash drives that hold less
information than a computer? 79 The court avoided bright-line rules based
exclusively on the type of device being searched (i.e., the container). 80
Instead, the court anchored its analysis in a reasonableness inquiry. 81
While differences in record format and storage capacity are insignificant,
the location of files at issue may be relevant.
C. Searches of Confidential Business Records
Professor Derek Regensburger argues that “[t]he search of business
computers may require different rules . . . because such searches
implicate unique concerns.” 82 Unlike personal computers, business
computers may contain thousands of records of individuals outside the
scope of the investigation. 83 “This is particularly true of searches of
innocent third parties, such as medical or law offices, which are merely
the repositories for the records relevant to the investigation.” 84
In response to these concerns and pursuant to the Privacy Protection
Act of 1980, 85 the Department of Justice promulgated a set of guidelines
to govern the obtaining of documentary materials held by third parties. 86
According to the guidelines, no federal officer should apply for a warrant
to search “a disinterested third party” unless the use of “less intrusive
alternative means of obtaining the materials would substantially

74. Id.view, filing cabinets, diaries, books, floppy drives, hard drives, paper bags, and other
storage devices would ‘all require different rules.’” Regensburger, supra note 10, at 1162–63
(quoting Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures: A
Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L .J. 193, 211 (2005)).
75. Giberson, 527 F.3d at 888.
76. United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 652, 654–55 (9th Cir. 1984).
77. Giberson, 527 F.3d at 888.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Regensburger, supra note 10, at 1166.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2009).
86. 28 C.F.R. § 59.4 (2009).
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jeopardize the availability or usefulness of the materials sought.” 87 The
guidelines define a disinterested third party as a person or group “not
reasonably believed to be . . . a suspect” in the offense to which the
materials relate. 88 If a search of a disinterested third party is conducted, it
should be done “in such a manner as to minimize, to the greatest extent
practicable, scrutiny of confidential materials.” 89
According to Professor Regensburger, “few cases have explored the
limitations these regulations impose on searches of medical or law
offices.” 90 The cases that do exist suggest that the government cannot act
as though the regulations are “nonexistent” 91 but may satisfy them if a
warrant specifies certain documents and requires the prosecution to seek
further guidance from the court before inspecting files. 92 However, the
regulations lack efficacy, as “failure to comply with [them] is not an
issue which may be litigated or form the basis for the suppression or
exclusion of evidence.” 93
III. UNITED STATES V. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING
A. Factual Background
Comprehensive Drug Testing involved the government’s
investigation into illegal steroid use among major league baseball
players. 94 The investigation centered on the Bay Area Lab Cooperative
(“Balco”), which the government suspected of providing illegal steroids
to athletes. 95 While investigating Balco, the government learned that
several players had tested positive under a confidential testing program
designed to determine the prevalence of steroid use in professional
baseball. 96 A third-party, Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (“CDT”),
administered the program. 97 Another company, Quest Diagnostics, Inc.
(“Quest”), performed the actual tests and maintained the urine samples. 98
Neither CDT nor Quest were suspected of wrongdoing.
87. Id.
88. Id. § 59.2(b)-(b)(1).
89. Id. § 59.4(b)(4).
90. Regensburger, supra note 10, at 1168.
91. Klitzman v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 962 (3d Cir. 1984).
92. In re Impounded Case, No. 875190, 840 F.2d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1988).
93. Regensburger, supra note 10, at 1168.
94. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). The facts
surrounding Comprehensive Drug Testing are complex; consequently, this discussion will focus on
information that relates directly to this Note.
95. Id. at 993.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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The government sought to seize information from CDT and Quest by
employing subpoenas and warrants in three different jurisdictions. In the
Northern District of California, the government obtained a subpoena
seeking all of CDT’s “drug testing records and specimens” relating to
Major League Baseball. 99 In the District of Nevada, the government
obtained a warrant for urine specimens stored at Quest’s Las Vegas
laboratory. 100 In the Central District of California, investigators secured a
warrant authorizing a search of CDT’s facilities for evidence pertaining
to ten specific players. 101
During the government’s search of CDT’s facilities, it located a
computer directory labeled “Tracey” that appeared to contain all of the
files for the company’s sports testing programs. 102 Investigators made a
copy of the entire directory for off-site review. Because the directory
“contained numerous subdirectories and hundreds of files,” 103 its
removal was permissible under the warrant. 104 During off-site analysis, a
case agent searched for “information pertaining to all professional
baseball players and used it to generate additional warrants and
subpoenas to advance the investigation.” 105 Investigators found
incriminating information in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet that
contained drug test results. 106 The names of the ten players mentioned in
the warrant issued in the Central District of California were interspersed
with the names of other players. To see the test results, the agent had to
scroll to the right until he reached the results column of the
spreadsheet. 107
Following the seizure, CDT and the Major League Baseball Players
Association moved for return of the property pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41(g). 108 They argued that the government had failed
to follow Tamura and had used the fruits of an illegal search to expand
their investigation beyond the ten players previously identified. 109 The

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 996.
103. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d 1085, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2008).
104. The warrant provided that
[i]f the computer equipment and storage devices cannot be searched on-site in a
reasonable amount of time, then the computer personnel will determine whether it is
practical to copy the data during the execution of the search in a reasonable amount of
time without jeopardizing the ability to preserve the data.
Id. at 1093.
105. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 999.
106. Id. at 1016 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 993 (majority opinion).
109. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d at 1105.
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Central District of California “found that the government had failed to
comply with the procedures specified in the warrant and, on that basis
and others, ordered the property returned.” 110 Similarly, the District of
Nevada required the government to return property seized from Quest,
and the Northern District of California quashed the government’s
subpoenas. 111 Comprehensive Drug Testing is the consolidated appeal in
which the government challenged these district court decisions.
B. The Panel Decision
1. Opinion
The three-judge panel upheld the seizure of intermingled documents,
concluding that the government did not demonstrate callous disregard in
conducting its search. 112 In so holding, the panel reversed the decisions
made by the lower courts.
According to the panel, the government acted in accordance with
Tamura when it “obtained advance authorization to seize intermingled
documents based upon a search warrant protocol that had been carefully
outlined and supported.” 113 The search protocol permitted the files to be
removed upon a computer specialist’s determination that the records
could not easily be separated on-site. 114 Agent Abboud, a computer
analyst, made this determination when he decided that “on-site review
would not be feasible in a reasonable amount of time.” 115
In addition to following Tamura, the government conducted its
search of CDT and Quest in a reasonable manner. Instead of seizing the
whole computer, the government made a copy of the Tracey directory,
which enabled CDT to continue its regular business operations. 116
Moreover, seizing the entire Tracey directory was reasonable because

110. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 993–94.
111. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d at 1090.
112. Id. at 1103.
113. Id. at 1110.
114. Id. The warrant provided that
[u]pon searching the premises, law enforcement personnel trained in searching and
seizing computer data (the ‘computer personnel’) will make an initial review of any
computer equipment and storage devices to determine whether these items can be
searched on-site in a reasonable amount of time and without jeopardizing the ability to
preserve data. . . . If the computer personnel determine that it is not practical to perform
an on-site search or make an onsite copy of the data within a reasonable amount of time,
then the computer equipment and storage devices will be seized and transported to an
appropriate law enforcement laboratory for review.
Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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electronically stored information is often unusable if embedded
information surrounding the file is missing. 117 Thus, by seizing the entire
directory, the government was ensuring that it could recover information
specified in the search warrants.
Interestingly, the court did not reach the government’s plain view
argument. According to the panel, the plain view doctrine is inapplicable
“because the evidence fell within the scope of the search warrant.” 118
Thus, the court concluded the seizure was justified and the information
seized provided a legitimate basis for expanded warrants. 119
Finally, the court overturned the district court’s ruling on the 41(g)
order, noting that evidence need not be returned so long as the
government “needs it and its conduct in acquiring the evidence was not
‘sufficiently reprehensible.’” 120
2. Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Thomas argued that the majority invented a new
and unwarranted justification for approving seizures. 121 According to
Judge Thomas, the majority held that “boilerplate terms of a computer
search warrant justify both the seizure of massive amounts of
confidential medical information about persons not suspected of any
criminal activity and the subsequent warrantless search of the
information.” 122 Thomas further argued that this justification for
approving searches and seizures should be abandoned because it would
“allow the government unprecedented easy access to confidential
medical and other private information about citizens who are under no
suspicion of having been involved in criminal activity.” 123

117. Id. at 1110–11. According to the Federal Judicial Center:
[S]ome computer-based transactions do not result in a conventional document, but
instead are represented in integrated databases. Even less-complex ESI [electronically
stored information] may be incomprehensible and unusable when separated from the
system that created it. For example, a spreadsheet produced in portable document format
(PDF) may be useless because embedded information, such as computational formulas,
cannot be seen or discerned. Finally, deleting an electronic document does not get rid of
it, as shredding a paper document would.
Id.
118. Id. at 1112.
119. Id.
120. Aaron Seiji Lowenstein, Search and Seizure on Steroids: United States v. Comprehensive
Drug Testing and Its Consequences for Private Information Stored on Commercial Electronic
Databases
(May
2007),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=aaron_lowenstein.
121. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d at 1117 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
122. Id.
123. Id. Moreover,
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In addition to inventing a new justification for seizures, Judge
Thomas argued that the court improperly ignored the government’s plain
view argument. 124 Judge Thomas addressed this argument and rejected it,
claiming that the government failed to provide any reason why the plain
view doctrine should apply to computers. 125 He further noted that “every
district judge involved in this case” 126 had rejected the government’s
plain view doctrine. 127
As an alternative to the majority’s approach, Judge Thomas proposed
that magistrates “examine the co-mingled data that the government
proposes to seize to make sure that private information that the
government is not authorized to see remains private.” 128 This approach
appears to have influenced the en banc decision that followed because,
like the en banc decision, it focused on increasing the responsibilities of
magistrates in cases involving intermingled data.

[a]t a time our medical institutions are working diligently to provide physicians with easy
nationwide electronic access to patient records in order to improve the care and treatment
of our citizens, the [majority] opinion poses a very serious threat to the confidentiality of
patient records and ultimately to the effective delivery of health care itself.
Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1124.
126. Id. at 1117.
127. Judge Illston of the Northern District of California made the following statement:
I find absolutely staggering the implications about what you say about the plain view
doctrine in the computer set up. In a way nothing is plain view because with the disk you
look at it, you don’t see anything until you stick it in the computer and it does take quite a
lot of work really to bring it up on the screen. So, it’s not in plain view in the sense of
walking into the room and seeing the scale on the desk. It takes a whole lot of work to get
there. First off, none of it is cursory, there are whole industries that have developed in
order to make it possible for the disk to show up on the screen that way. So it’s not
cursory review. I don’t think it’s plain view. I don’t think I have to go that far or make
that kind of choice with respect to issues that are certainly going to arise. . . . Where it
requires sorting through information which really is on a data base, somehow it’s being
organized in different formats, you could organize it in a format based on the ten names,
instead of taking it in other kinds of formats, then scrolling across and taking names and
information off the screen, when it’s clearly information that isn’t part of what was
originally within the authorized search warrant, I just think is impermissible.
Id. at 1124.
128. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 473 F.3d 915, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2006)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (withdrawn and superseded by 513 F.3d 1085
(9th Cir. 2008).
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C. The En Banc Decision
1. The majority opinion
On rehearing en banc, the court found that the district courts had
acted appropriately by requiring the government to return copies of the
seized evidence. 129 In reaching this conclusion, the court promulgated
five new guidelines:
(1) Magistrates should insist that the government waive reliance
upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases.
(2) Segregation and redaction must be either done by specialized
personnel or an independent third party. If the segregation is
to be done by government computer personnel, [the
government] must agree in the warrant application that the
computer personnel will not disclose to the investigators any
information other than that which is the target of the warrant.
(3) Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of
destruction of information as well as prior efforts to seize
that information in other judicial fora.
(4) The government’s search protocol must be designed to
uncover only the information for which it has probable
cause, and only that information may be examined by the
case agents.
(5) The government must destroy or, if the recipient may
lawfully possess it, return non-responsive data, keeping the
issuing magistrate informed about when it has done so and
what it has kept. 130
First, the court found that the plain view doctrine should not apply to
computers. If the government cannot be sure where the information is
stored on the computer, it may search the entire computer. Thus, when
files are intermingled (which is always the case in electronic searches)
the plain view doctrine turns “a limited search for particular information
into a general search of office file systems and computer databases.” 131
According to the court, such a search would “make a mockery of Tamura
and render the carefully crafted safeguards in the Central District warrant
a nullity.” 132 Thus, the court concluded that the plain view doctrine could
129.
(en banc).
130.
131.
132.

United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009)
Id.
Id. at 998.
Id.
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not be used to expand the warrant to include other names found in the
Tracey directory.
Second, the court required that searches of intermingled data be
conducted by specialized personnel or by an independent third party. If
the search is conducted by specialized personnel, the government must
agree that such personnel will not disclose information beyond the scope
of the warrant without a magistrate’s approval. 133 Moreover, in cases
where the search revolves around an innocent third party, and “the
privacy interests of numerous other parties who are not under suspicion
of criminal wrongdoing are implicated by the search, the presumption
should be that the segregation of the data will be conducted by, or under
the close supervision of, an independent third party selected by the
court.” 134 In Comprehensive Drug Testing, the government failed to
satisfy this rule when Agent Novitsky—the lead investigator—opened
and viewed the intermingled contents of the Tracey directory. 135
Third, the court found that the government must disclose the actual
degree of risk that the evidence will be concealed or destroyed. 136 In this
case, the government did not disclose to District Court Judge Johnson
that “[CDT] had agreed to keep the data intact until its motion to quash
the subpoena could be ruled on by the Northern California district court,
and that the United States Attorney’s Office had accepted this
representation.” 137
Fourth, the court held that the government must outline and follow
specific search protocols. Moreover, specific search tools may only be
used if there is probable cause to believe the information will be found.
The court found that the government had not established specific search
protocols to ensure that the search was limited to the ten names listed in
the warrant. 138
Finally, once the government has segregated the documents, the
information outside the terms of the warrant must “be destroyed or, at
least so long as they may be lawfully possessed by the party from whom

133. Id. at 1006–07.
134. Id. at 1000.
135. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d 1085, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008).
136. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 1006.
137. Id. at 998.
138. Id. at 999. The court provided an example to illustrate the fourth guideline:
[T]he government has sophisticated hashing tools at its disposal that allow the
identification of well-known illegal files (such as child pornography) without actually
opening the files themselves. These and similar search tools may not be used without
specific authorization in the warrant, and such permission may only be given if there is
probable cause to believe that such files can be found on the electronic medium to be
seized.
Id.
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they were seized, returned along with the actual physical medium that
may have been seized (such as a hard drive or computer).” 139
The procedures established by the court provide guidance for
handling cases involving computer searches. 140 However, the court noted
that in the end reviewing judges must trust “the good sense and vigilance
of our magistrate judges, who are in the front line of preserving the
constitutional freedoms of our citizens while assisting the government in
its legitimate efforts to prosecute criminal activity.” 141
D. Super En Banc?
Unlike other circuits, the Ninth Circuit is so large that en banc
decisions are made by eleven of the twenty-eight authorized judgeships.
However, “[Ninth] circuit rules provide for review by the full court upon
the request of any judge.” 142 A super-en-banc 143 “has never happened
since the limited en banc rule was adopted by the Court in 1980.” 144
While unprecedented, the Ninth Circuit is currently considering the
possibility of conducting a super-en-banc review of Comprehensive Drug
Testing. On November 4, 2009, Judge Kozinski entered an order asking
the parties to brief whether the case should be reheard by the full en banc
court. 145 The ruling in Comprehensive Drug Testing placed a heavy
burden on investigative agencies by taxing already stretched resources;
consequently, on November 23, 2009, the government filed a brief in
support of a rehearing en banc by the full court. 146

139. Id. at 1000.
140. Id. at 1006.
141. Id.
142. Statement of Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Courts, http://www.fedbar.org/Kozinski_testimony.pdf (emphasis added).
143. Orin Kerr, DOJ Files Brief Supporting Super-En-Banc in CDT (Nov. 24, 2009),
http://volokh.com/2009/11/24/doj-files-brief-supporting-super-en-banc-in-cdt/.
144. Kozinski, supra note 142.
145. Order, United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., No. 05-10067 (9th Cir. Nov.
4, 2009), available at http://volokh.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/CDTOrder.pdf. (stating
that Judge Kozinski’s order was as follows: “By November 25, 2009, the parties shall file
simultaneous briefs addressing whether this case should be reheard en banc by the full court.”).
146. Orin Kerr, DOJ Files Brief Supporting Super-En-Banc in CDT (Nov. 24, 2009),
http://volokh.com/2009/11/24/doj-files-brief-supporting-super-en-banc-in-cdt/.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Plain View Doctrine Should Not Be Abandoned in the Electronic
Search Context
In Comprehensive Drug Testing, the court rejected the government’s
plain view argument and held that in future cases “[m]agistrates should
insist that the government waive reliance upon the plain view doctrine in
digital evidence cases.” 147 The court’s unprecedented holding is partially
based on an apparent misapplication of Tamura.
The en banc decision overlooks the fact that Tamura “is a solution to
the problem of overbroad seizures, not overbroad searches. The
defendant in Tamura did not challenge either the warrant or the search of
the documents; rather, it was only the seizure that was challenged.” 148
In Comprehensive Drug Testing, the court incorrectly applied
Tamura to a search of documents occurring after a valid Tamura seizure.
The initial seizure of the entire Tracey directory was valid because the
government had obtained advanced authorization for segregating the
materials off-site. 149 Thus, the government did not make “a mockery of
Tamura.” 150
Once the special requirements of Tamura have been satisfied, the
search of intermingled documents should be treated no differently than
other searches. It makes no sense to allow investigators to rely on the
plain view doctrine when they are looking for small items in a house and
not when they are looking for a file on a computer. Small items, like a
single electronic file, can be hidden virtually anywhere. Moreover, “there
can be no doubt that the search of a person’s entire home presents the
opportunity for officers to observe vast amounts of information about a
person’s private life.” 151 Thus, if the plain view doctrine applies during

147. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009)
(en banc).
148. Ziff, supra note 48, at 859.
149. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 996. The affidavit supporting the search
warrant explained that, if necessary, the agents could conduct an off-site search. Id.
150. Id. at 998.
151. Ziff, supra note 48, at 871.
In the case of a search for documents or other small items in a person’s home, officers are
permitted to go ‘through the residence with a fine tooth comb.’ For example, in one case
from the Seventh Circuit, an officer was permitted to examine a notebook pursuant to a
warrant to search for cocaine because cocaine ‘is commonly distributed . . . in small vials
and envelopes and, thus, is easily concealable in confined areas, such as notebooks,’ even
though the agent testified that he intended to look for things other than cocaine. Indeed,
while courts must always be vigilant against overbroad searches, ‘searches of computer
records are no less constitutional than searches of physical records.
Id. (citations omitted).
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the search of small items in one’s home, it should also apply while
looking for files on a person’s computer.
In addition to misapplying Tamura, the court seemed to resurrect the
pre-Horton inadvertence requirement. In Horton, the U.S. Supreme
Court concluded that the subjective intent of officers does not affect the
scope of a warrant. 152 The Court later noted that “the fact that the officer
does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons
which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not
invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify that action.” 153
Judge Thomas’s dissent in the panel decision provides evidence that
the court may have relied on the government’s subjective intent.
According to Judge Thomas:
The record reflects no forensic lab analysis, no defusing of booby traps,
no decryption, no cracking of passwords and certainly no effort by a
dedicated computer specialist to separate data for which the
government had probable cause from everything else in the Tracey
Directory. Instead, as soon as the Tracey Directory was extracted from
the CDT computers, the case agent assumed control over it, examined
the list of all professional baseball players and extracted the names of
those who had tested positive for steroids. 154

Even more damning was U.S. Attorney Nedrow’s statement that Agent
Novitsky intended to “briefly peruse [the Tracey directory] to see if there
was anything above and beyond that which was authorized for seizure in
the initial warrant.” 155 However, following the analysis in Horton, the
fact that the government was unusually efficient in its search or may
have intended to use the plain view doctrine to find more steroid users is
irrelevant because (1) the search itself was valid and (2) the
government’s intent should be irrelevant. 156
In addition to ignoring Horton, at least one en banc judge overlooked
the implications of the Beusch decision. Judge Bea, concurring in part

152. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138–40 (1990).
153. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978).
154. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 999.
155. Id.
156. The court’s violation of Horton parallels the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Carey.
Carey’s violation of Horton was recognized by Jim Dowel in Criminal Procedure: Tenth
Circuit Erroneously Allows Officers’ Intentions to Define Reasonable Searches: United
States v. Carey. In response to Carey, Dowell proposed an objective test to replace
Carey’s inadvertence requirement. Under the test, courts objectively evaluate officers’
‘objective judgments about which files could reasonably contain the evidence sought.’
Ziff, supra note 48, at 857.
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and dissenting in part, argued that the incriminating nature of the other
names in the Tracey directory was not “immediately apparent” and thus
the names were not in “plain view.” 157 The names of the players tested
by CDT were contained in a single Excel spreadsheet file. To “avoid
scrolling to the right and viewing the results column for all of the
ballplayers instead of just for the targeted ten,” Judge Bea proposed a
particular search protocol. 158 As Judge Bea suggests, the names in the
spreadsheet were “theoretically separable.” However, according to
Beusch, information contained in a single file need not be separated and
“[t]he fact that an item seized happens to contain other incriminating
information not covered by the terms of the warrant does not compel its
suppression, either in whole or in part.” 159 Thus, because the spreadsheet
was a single file, the government was under no obligation to remove the
ten names with surgeon-like precision.
Finally, instead of abandoning the plain view doctrine entirely, the
court should have struck a more measured tone. Judge Callahan could
not “subscribe to the majority’s generalized requirement that the
government foreswear reliance on the plain view doctrine in digital
evidence cases or that magistrate judges insist on such a waiver by the
government.” 160 According to Judge Callahan, the plain view doctrine is
applicable in other electronic contexts. For example, in Wong, the court
applied the doctrine “to discovery of child pornography in the context of
a valid search of a computer for evidence related to a murder
investigation.” 161 Thus, even assuming that plain view should not apply

157. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 1016 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
158. Id. According to Judge Bea, all Agent Novitsky had to do to avoid viewing the other
names was the following:
While depressing and holding the Control key, he would click on the numbers on the left
side of the spreadsheet that corresponded to the rows that contain the names of the
targeted ballplayers. The rows containing those ballplayers’ names would become
highlighted. Novitsky would then release the Control key. He would next go to the top of
the screen, click on the “Edit” menu, and choose “Copy.” Then, he would click on the
“File” menu at the top of the screen, and choose “New Blank Workbook.” When the new
blank spread-sheet appeared on the screen, he would click on the “Edit” menu in the new
blank spreadsheet and choose “Paste.” The rows of the ten targeted ballplayers selected
in the original spreadsheet and only those rows would appear in the new spreadsheet.
Novitsky would then scroll to the right in the new blank spreadsheet and would see only
the testing results for the targeted ballplayers for whom he had probable cause to search
and seize.
Id. at 1016 n.2.
159. United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 1979).
160. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 1011 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
161. Id.; United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2003).
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in this particular case, the wholesale abandonment of the doctrine was
unwarranted. 162
B. Problems with the En Banc Decision
1. The guidelines place too heavy a burden on investigating agencies
The guidelines established by the Ninth Circuit in Comprehensive
Drug Testing place too heavy a burden on investigating agencies by
requiring the government to use “specialized personnel or an
independent third party” 163 to segregate and redact electronic
information. 164 Due to pressure on already tight government budgets,
using independent third parties raises cost-related concerns. Moreover,
the use of specialized personnel within the agency has serious
drawbacks.
Professor Derek Regensburger illustrated some of the problems with
using specialized personnel within an agency, commonly known as taint
teams, 165 to segregate data. 166 According to Regensburger, “the obvious
drawback to this approach is that it exposes potentially confidential
162. Compare Ziff, supra note 48, with Orin Kerr, An Analysis of United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing (Dec. 9, 2008), http://volokh.com/posts/chain_1228354570.shtml
(“Plain view needs to be narrowed, and in my view, may ultimately need to be abandoned in digital
searches altogether. The plain view exception is based on an understanding of the role of the
particularity requirement that is inaccurate for digital searches: The particularity requirement
imposes much less of a limitation in the digital search context, and I think ultimately the most
serious way to restore the role of the particularity requirement in digital evidence cases is to limit or
abolish plain view; otherwise the exception swallows the rule.”).
163. The second guideline provides that
[s]egregation and redaction must be either done by specialized personnel or an
independent third party. If the segregation is to be done by government computer
personnel, it must agree in the warrant application that the computer personnel will not
disclose to the investigators any information other than that which is the target of the
warrant.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 1006 (majority opinion).
164. Judge Callahan believes that this guideline
raises practical, cost-related concerns. With respect to using an in-house computer
specialist to segregate data, the majority’s guideline essentially requires that law
enforcement agencies keep a “walled-off,” non-investigatory computer specialist on staff
for use in searches of digital evidence. To comply, an agency would have to expand its
personnel, likely at a significant cost, to include both computer specialists who could
segregate data and forensic computer specialists who could assist in the subsequent
investigation. The alternative would be to use an independent third party consultant,
which no doubt carries its own significant expense. Both of these options would force
law enforcement agencies to incur great expense, perhaps a crushing expense for smaller
police departments that already face tremendous budget pressures.
Id. at 1013 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Taint teams consist of government personnel who are not otherwise involved in the case
under investigation. These teams review all the electronic records and identify the portions of those
records that the investigators who are handling the case should not see.
166. Regensburger, supra note 10, at 1166.
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information to the eyes of the taint team. It also relies heavily on the
integrity of the personnel involved not to breach the Chinese Wall.” 167
These risks are not merely theoretical; taint teams “have been implicated
in the past in leaks of confidential information to prosecutors.” 168 In one
case, a taint team turned over tapes of attorney-client conversations to the
prosecuting team. 169 This incident demonstrates the problem with taint
teams as “[t]he government’s fox is left in charge of the appellants’
henhouse, and may err by neglect or malice, as well as by honest
differences of opinion.” 170 These concerns may explain why “court
response has been equivocal to the use of taint teams.” 171
Thus, practical concerns and financial burdens make the guidelines
too much of a burden on investigating agencies. Specifically, the taint
team requirement should be abandoned. 172 Instead of using taint teams,
the government should continue “using the more traditional alternatives
of submitting disputed documents under seal for in camera review by a
neutral and detached magistrate or by court-appointed special
masters.” 173 In addition to being the more efficient approach, using
magistrates is supported by case law.
2. The guidelines are premature because computer forensics is rapidly
evolving
Professor Orin Kerr has argued for a laissez-faire application of the
Fourth Amendment to evolving technologies. 174 According to Kerr,
“[w]hen technology is in flux, Fourth Amendment protections should
remain relatively modest until the technology stabilizes.” 175 There is no
question that computer forensics is rapidly changing as “[i]nvestigators
and sophisticated wrongdoers inevitably play a cat-and-mouse game in
which suspects try to hide evidence and forensic analysts try to find

167. Id. at 1170. The “Chinese Wall” refers to the separation between members of the taint
team and the prosecution team.
168. Id. at 1171.
169. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 F.3d 511, 523 (6th Cir. 2006).
170. Id.
171. Regensburger, supra note 10, at 1170. Nonetheless, while “the use of taint teams is
‘unwise’ and creates an ‘appearance of unfairness,’ [one district court] found their use does not
offend the Constitution absent a showing of harm resulting from disclosure of the privileged
information.” Id. at 1171 (citing United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834, 841 (D.D.C. 1997)).
172. Furthermore, as Judge Callahan notes, “the majority offers no support for its protocol
requiring the segregation of computer data by specialized personnel or an independent third party.”
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see id. at 1000–01, 1006 (majority opinion).
173. Regensburger, supra note 10, at 1171.
174. Kerr, supra note 9.
175. Id. at 805.
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it.” 176 Some experts forecast the development of sophisticated search
tools that focus on evidence described in the warrant. While a “Perfect
Tool” 177 may never emerge, forensic searches will probably become
increasingly sophisticated in the near future.
With changes on the horizon, Judge Callahan’s more cautious
analysis is appropriate. According to Judge Callahan, “[a] measured
approach based on the facts of a particular case is especially warranted in
the case of computer-related technology, which is constantly and quickly
evolving.” 178 Judge Callahan’s approach fits with Kerr’s theory that “we
should look first to Congress when technology is changing rapidly.” 179
Kerr believes that by focusing on legislative rules “the legal system [will
be able] to generate better rules—rules that are more nuanced, clear, and
that optimize the critical balance between privacy and public safety more
effectively when technology is in flux.” 180
3. The guidelines are too broad
The most troubling aspect of Comprehensive Drug Testing is not the
ruling itself, but the expansive guidelines tacked on at the end of the
decision. These guidelines, 181 which really amount to bright-line rules, 182
are not anchored in a case or controversy. 183 Moreover, based on the
176. Kerr, supra note 4.
177. Id. at 570.
178. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009)
(en banc) (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Bea agreed with Judge
Callahan on this point: “The common law method permits us to evaluate different cases over time to
discern the most sensible rule given the technologies that develop; I’m afraid the majority opinion
short-circuits this process in an area where the capabilities of computer software are still rapidly
evolving.” Id. at 1018 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
179. Kerr, supra note 9, at 806.
180. Id.
181. According to Judge Callahan, even though “the majority’s [plain view] guideline is
framed in terms of what a magistrate ‘should insist,’ the practical effect of this guideline is to
prescribe a mandatory procedure. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 1013 n.8 (Callahan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182. Judge Bea, concurring in part and dissenting in part, cautioned that “we must treat our
establishment of brightline rules with great care and deliberation; at the very least, amici should have
an opportunity to weigh in on the dramatic doctrinal shift the majority’s guidelines contemplate.” Id.
at 1018 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion of some of the benefits
and drawbacks of bright-line rules, see Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379
(1986). One common drawback of such rules is that “[b]y specifying a sharp line between forbidden
and permissible conduct, [they] permit and encourage activity up to the boundary of permissible
conduct.” Id. at 384–85.
183. See Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, Publications, Attorneys, Academics Sort
Through
Landmark
Case
on
Computer
Searches,
http://www.sonnenschein.com/pubs/publications/Marc-Zwillinger-Electronic-Commerce-Law.html
(“The Ninth Circuit’s opinion does not make clear whether its imposition of the new restrictions is
based on the Fourth Amendment or, instead, on the circuit court’s supervisory authority over the
district courts’ issuance of warrants. The source of the court’s authority not only has impact in

394

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 24

facts before it, the court’s actual holding was quite narrow: (1)
government was barred under the doctrine of issue preclusion from
contesting determination that it callously disregarded affected players’
constitutional rights; (2) district court did not abuse its discretion by
requiring the government to return copies of the seized evidence; and (3)
district court did not abuse its discretion in quashing the government’s
subpoena. 184
The guidelines, in contrast, constitute expansive dicta that guide the
procedure and ultimately the outcome of all future digital evidence cases.
Judge Callahan noted that “[r]ather than adopting this efficient but
overbroad approach, the prudent course would be to allow the contours
of [digital evidence rules] to develop incrementally through the normal
course of fact-based case adjudication.” 185 Thus, as prophylactic dicta,
the guidelines represent an attack on the common law approach to
jurisprudence. 186
In addition to lacking a clear foundation, the guidelines fall prey to
the bane of all bright-line rules: over-inclusiveness. The case before the
court in Comprehensive Drug Testing is uncommon because it involves
the seizure of medical records implicating unidentified third parties. In
the electronic context, it is far more common for cases to involve child
pornography. Consequently, the court is using an outlier case to establish
procedures for all future electronic evidence cases.
C. How the Court Should Have Ruled
The court should have reached the same result without promulgating
the expansive guidelines outlined in the decision. First, instead of using
the guidelines, the court could have narrowed its decision to cases
involving medical data. The medical privacy issue is “one of the things
that gets folks worked up” 187 about the Comprehensive Drug Testing
decision. In recent years, “personal health information on hundreds of
thousands of people has been compromised because of security lapses at
hospitals, insurance companies and government agencies. These
matters of civil liability and retroactivity, it also will greatly affect the applicability of the new
protocols outside the Ninth Circuit.”).
184. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 989 (majority opinion).
185. Id. at 1013 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. According to Judge Bea,
the establishment of guidelines (which are little more than dicta but are nonetheless
binding precedent in [the Ninth circuit], see Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d
1120, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003)) in the manner chosen by the majority goes against the grain
of the common law method of reasoned decision making, by which rules evolve from
cases over-time.
Id. at 1018 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187. Kerr, supra note 162.
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breaches occurred despite federal privacy rules issued under a 1996
law.” 188 Understandably, many people—including members of the
judiciary—are concerned about medical privacy. “Congress could avoid
some of the difficulties here by expanding the Privacy Protection Act 189
to include special rules for searches involving medical records.” 190
A second way the court could have limited its decision is by
narrowing it to searches involving the confidential business records of
innocent third parties. Searches of third party business computers are
easily distinguishable from personal computer searches because the
former often involve thousands of records relating to individuals outside
the scope of the investigation. 191 The court could have found that the
Privacy Protection Act of 1980 requires special protections in the third
party context to “minimize, to the greatest extent practicable, scrutiny of
confidential materials.” 192 This interpretation would be reasonable even
though few cases have explored the contours of the Act. 193
D. The Future of Comprehensive Drug Testing
With its sweeping new rules, the en banc decision in Comprehensive
Drug Testing may be short lived. According to Orin Kerr, as of
December 20, 2009, “no federal court has agreed with CDT in a written
opinion since the decision came down in August.” 194 The Seventh
Circuit recently declined to follow Comprehensive Drug Testing,
concluding that “there is nothing in the Supreme Court’s case law (or the
Ninth Circuit’s for that matter) counseling the complete abandonment of
the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases.” 195
Some legal experts believe there is a good chance that the U.S.
Supreme Court will review the decision if the government appeals. 196
Others are not so sure. According to Kerr, “the justices might prefer to
wait for future Ninth Circuit opinions to clarify the authority [the court]
was relying upon in [CDT] and some of the other murkier aspects of the

188. Robert Pear, Privacy Issue Complicates Push to Link Medical Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/18/us/politics/18health.html.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2009).
190. Kerr, supra note 162.
191. Regensburger, supra note 10, at 1166.
192. 28 C.F.R. § 59.4 (2009).
193. Regensburger, supra note 10, at 1168.
20,
2009),
194. Orin
Kerr,
Cuffing
Digital
Detectives
(Dec.
http://volokh.com/2009/12/20/cuffing-digital-detectives/
195. United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2010).
196. See Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, supra note 183.
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[case].” 197 One way or another, this case will continue to receive
significant attention in the coming months.
V. CONCLUSION
In Comprehensive Drug Testing, the Ninth Circuit radically changed
the legal landscape surrounding computer searches by creating a set of
guidelines. These guidelines are expansive and require the government to
waive its reliance on the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases. By
eliminating the plain view doctrine in the digital evidence cases this
court handed down a decision inconsistent with past case law and Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. The court’s decision was burdensome,
premature, and too broad. It would have been more appropriate for the
court to have decided the case on more narrow grounds such as medical
data privacy or innocent third party involvement. While it is difficult to
determine the future of Comprehensive Drug Testing, the case has a good
chance of being reviewed by a super en banc or by the U.S. Supreme
Court.
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